Trust Centre ยท Security
Security you can ask questions about.
What the platform does to keep operators apart, keep unknown traffic out and keep sensitive changes on the record.
Controls
What is in place.
| Capability | Status | What that means |
|---|---|---|
| Per operator process isolation | Live | Each operator's code runs as its own user in its own process pool. |
| Unknown host refusal | Live | Requests for a hostname with no recognised operator are refused. |
| Operator suspension | Live | A suspended operator is served a holding page, not normal content. |
| Sensitive write audit | Live | Actor, reason, before and after for money, entries and marketing. |
| Operator tagged error reporting | Live | Every error carries the operator context that produced it. |
| Server side validation on checkout | Live | Skill answers and limits are checked on the server, not trusted to the browser. |
| Tamper refusal on draws | Live | A changed entry list stops the draw. |
| Scoped API tokens | Built | Present in the product. The public API is not offered. |
| HMAC signed webhooks | Built | Signed per event, with retry and delivery logging. |
Live proven on the deployed platform. Built in the product with passing tests, not yet proven with live customers. Roadmap planned, not a working feature.
Shared by design
Operators share the platform, not the runtime process.
The database is shared between operators by design, in part because cross operator exclusion depends on shared visibility at the relevant data layer. Isolation is at the process and runtime level.
We state that plainly because a security page that hides architecture is not much of a security page.
Isolation where it matters. Shared state where the product requires it.
What we do not claim
No badges we do not hold.
- Security certifications or accreditations
- Penetration test results we have not published
- A public status page or uptime figure
- Anonymity for the cross operator register
If any of these change, they will appear here with the evidence.
